Two weeks ago, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued a decision in a case which addressed the question of whether and under what circumstances the Alimony Reform Act (M.G.L. ch. 208 §§48-55), permits a judge to award alimony based on a percentage of the paying spouse’s income. Given the importance of the issue, Sandy Durland and Glenn Schley, prepared and filed an amici curiae brief (literally, a “friend of the court” brief), where they offered their analysis on the issue.
In their brief, Sandy and Glenn argued that alimony awards must be narrowly tailored to the specific financial circumstances of the parties involved. Notwithstanding the statutory overhaul under the Alimony Reform Act, they argued that the basic tenets of alimony awards did not change and that any award of alimony must still be based upon a determination of the specific needs of the recipient spouse and the income and ability of the payor spouse to meet those needs at the time of the award. But, when there are certain narrow or “special circumstances,” where a traditional alimony payment will not appropriately address the specific needs and financial circumstances of the parties, the Reform Act would permit alimony to be based solely on a percentage of the payor spouse’s income.
On September 25, 2017, in Young vs. Young, the S.J.C. largely agreed with the approach suggested by Sandy and Glenn and, in a decision that continues to define alimony awards under the Alimony Reform Act, ruled that the husband (a senior executive at Fidelity Investments) will not have to pay 33% of his future income to his former wife. The S.J.C. noted that there may be special circumstances, such as where the payor spouse’s income is highly variable year-to-year and affects the spouse’s ability to pay, where an alimony award based on a percentage of the payor’s spouse’s income would be appropriate, so long as the percentage-based formula does not exceed the needs and marital lifestyle of the recipient spouse.
Here is a link to the case decision: http://law.justia.com/…/m…/supreme-court/2017/sjc-12240.html
Recently, the S.J.C. issued a decision, in George vs. George, which addressed the issue of whether a trial judge, on a complaint for modification of an alimony judgment that predated the Alimony Reform Act, may deviate from the durational limits of M.G.L. ch 208 §49, on the basis that the alimony provisions of the parties’ separation agreement, which were merged into the judgment, were inextricably connected with the property division provisions of the agreement, which survived the judgment.
In the decision, the S.J.C. engaged in a discussion regarding deviations “in the interests of justice,” after proof “by preponderance of the evidence” (see page 9 of the decision). Section 49(e) states that, “unless the payor and recipient agree otherwise, general term alimony may be modified in duration or amount upon a material change of circumstances warranting modification.” Section 49(f)(2) goes on to say that the court may grant a recipient an extension of an existing alimony order for good cause shown; provided, however, that in granting an extension, the court shall enter written findings of (i) a material change in circumstances that occurred after entry of the alimony judgment; and (ii) reasons for the extension that are supported by clear and convincing evidence.”
In George, the S.J.C. acknowledged the clear and convincing standard at the bottom of page 5 (onto page 6), namely that under “the act, general term alimony may be modified in amount and duration upon a material change of circumstance.” Yet, it then concluded at Page 9, that “the recipient spouse bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that deviation beyond the presumptive termination date is ‘required in the interests of justice’” pursuant to Section 49(b).
It is uncertain how that portion of the George decision and Section 49(f)(2) can be read together. In this respect, it may be that the S.J.C. is mistaken.
We are pleased to announce that Phyllis Federico, was honored last month at the 2016 Top Women of Law event, which celebrates exceptional women lawyers who have made tremendous professional strides and demonstrated great accomplishments in the legal field. The annual award honors and highlights women who are pioneers, educators, trailblazers and role models – a description which fits Phyllis perfectly.
Schmidt & Federico is pleased to announce that five members of the firm have received a Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review Rating of “AV.”
Mary and Bill Schmidt, Sandy Durland and Phyllis Federico, as well as Jennifer Sevigney Durand. all received the AV® Preeminent™ (4.5-5.0) certification mark, indicating that their peers have ranked them at the highest level of professional excellence in their field
Recently, Representative John Fernandes filed Massachusetts House Bill HD4546 to amend the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, to address the decisions by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Chin vs. Merriot – which our partner, Sandy Durland, argued to the S.J.C. – and in Rodman vs. Rodman and Doktor vs Doktor, which ruled that, insofar as the Reform Act’s presumption that alimony would end upon an alimony payer’s reaching retirement age and/or upon the recipient spouse’s cohabitation, those provisions would apply only to alimony payers who were divorced after March 1, 2012 (the effective date of the Act). The Bill would make the Reform Act apply to all existing alimony obligations, including those who were divorced prior to March 1, 2012.